The Yantar Incident: Assessment of Non-Kinetic Disablement

Russian spy ship Yantar operating close to UK waters near vital undersea cables

In November 2025, the Russian spy ship Yantar operated on the edge of UK territorial waters north of Scotland. The ship, operated by Russia’s GUGI deep-sea research directorate, is widely assessed as an undersea surveillance and cable-mapping platform rather than a benign research vessel.

During this deployment, UK authorities reported that Yantar:

• Directed lasers at an RAF P-8A Poseidon surveillance aircraft monitoring its activities, in what the Defence Secretary described as a “deeply dangerous” action.

• Conducted GPS jamming in the vicinity of the Type 23 frigate HMS Somerset and nearby merchant shipping, amounting to unprofessional and potentially hazardous behaviour in busy sea lanes.

The incident occurred against a wider backdrop of increased Russian naval activity around the UK, including the passage of a Russian corvette and tanker through the English Channel, shadowed by HMS Severn.

UK Defence Secretary John Healey made clear that “military options are ready” should Yantar escalate or threaten critical infrastructure, underlining London’s concern about undersea cables as critical national infrastructure and likely targets in grey-zone competition.

This is the real-world trigger for the scenario considered here.

1. Concept of operations in the scenario

The scenario assumes that the UK possesses a non-kinetic, high-power microwave / EMP-like capability able to disable the electrical systems of a single surface vessel at moderate range without visible physical damage and without causing casualties.

There is no public evidence that such a system is in service; it is an analytical assumption used to explore decision-making. However, this assumption is not speculative in a science-fiction sense: non-nuclear EMP and high-power microwave (HPM) weapons have been actively researched and prototyped for decades.

The proposed course of action consists of four steps:

1. Covert non-kinetic disablement

   • Yantar is targeted so that propulsion and most electrical power are lost near, but outside, UK territorial waters.

   • The effect is indistinguishable to the crew from a catastrophic internal electrical failure.

2. Distress and response

   • After attempts to restore power fail, the Russian master issues a distress or PAN PAN call in accordance with maritime practice.

   • A Royal Navy unit already shadowing the ship (e.g. HMS Somerset or another suitable vessel) responds.

3. Assistance-only tow to port

   • The UK offers and provides towage to the nearest appropriate British port on safety grounds, citing obligations under international maritime law.

   • Throughout, the UK strictly limits activity to safety and engineering support: no covert intelligence collection on board the Russian vessel.

4. Managed public communication

   • The UK makes the tow and port call highly visible: photographs, basic timelines, and factual statements about assisting a foreign vessel in difficulty.

   • Public messaging emphasises seamanship and legal obligations, not humiliation. Any commentary about Yantar’s obsolescence or unreliability is left to non-official voices.

   
   

This is the scenario to be evaluated: a deliberate non-kinetic disablement followed by a clean and public assistance operation.

2. Strategic rationale

Deterrence and Signalling

The core strategic logic is to:

• Impose a cost on a pattern of hostile grey-zone activity (lasers, jamming) without resorting to overt kinetic force.

• Demonstrate, quietly, that London is capable of reversing the initiative against sensitive Russian platforms operating near UK critical infrastructure.

• Do so in a manner that, outwardly, is consistent with international norms and humanitarian obligations.

If Moscow infers that Yantar was deliberately disabled but cannot prove it, it receives a clear but deniable signal that:

• UK counter-measures are not limited to passive shadowing or diplomatic protest.

• Specific high-value assets engaged in grey-zone activity can be rendered ineffective at a time and place of London’s choosing.

Narrative advantage

Visibly, the outcome of the scenario is:

• A Russian intelligence vessel, previously associated with dangerous behaviour, is towed into a British port following a major systems failure.

• The Royal Navy fulfils its duty to a vessel in distress in a professional and public manner.

This combination tends to:

• Reinforce the narrative of Russian recklessness (lasers, jamming, subsequent breakdown).

• Reinforce the narrative of British responsibility and adherence to international law and norms at sea.

For allies and neutral observers, the image is of a capable, restrained UK facing an increasingly erratic Russia, rather than the reverse.

Preserving legal and normative positioning

Deliberately not exploiting access to the disabled vessel for intelligence purposes is a critical part of the concept.

• State vessels enjoy sovereign immunity; abusing a distress situation to conduct covert searches, if exposed, would undermine the very norms the UK relies on to protect its own ships.

• An “assistance-only” posture allows London to claim clean hands even if Russia later alleges sabotage.

In short, the scenario trades away a one-off intelligence opportunity in exchange for a more durable legal and political position.

3. Legal and political implications

Use of force and thresholds

Non-kinetic disablement of a foreign state vessel in peacetime would, in legal debates, sit close to the threshold of an unlawful use of force, even if conducted outside territorial waters and without casualties. Advocates of the measure would argue, however, that prior hostile acts such as directing military-grade lasers at UK aircraft and persistent GPS jamming in busy sea lanes are relevant aggravating factors when assessing necessity and proportionality, even if they do not remove the underlying legal sensitivity.

Key considerations:

• Scale and effects: If the effect is temporary and reversible, some would argue it falls short of an “armed attack” but still constitutes a use of force under the UN Charter.

• Intent and necessity: The UK would likely frame the action, if ever disclosed, as a necessary response to repeated hostile acts (lasers, jamming) that jeopardised safety and infrastructure.

Because the capability is unacknowledged, the UK avoids immediate legal scrutiny, but it also cannot rely on explicit legal justification without revealing the operation.

Sovereign immunity and conduct in port

Once in a British port, Yantar remains a sovereign immune vessel. The assistance-only approach is consistent with:

• International customary law on warships and other state vessels in foreign ports.

• The UK’s interest in preserving strong norms around respect for sovereign immune platforms.

Any covert exploitation in port, if exposed, would have significant implications for future reciprocity: Russian treatment of UK or NATO state vessels in similar circumstances.

Domestic and alliance politics

Domestically, visible humanitarian assistance and adherence to law are politically defensible. The government can present:

• A robust public record of previous Russian provocations,

• A transparent account of how the RN responded to a distress call, and

• A measured communications strategy that avoids triumphalism.

Within NATO, the move is more complex. Allies would likely seek private reassurance on three points:

1. Whether they were informed or consulted prior to the non-kinetic action.

2. How this capability fits within agreed deterrence and escalation frameworks.

3. What risk this creates of Russian retaliation against their own vessels or infrastructure.

The absence of exploitation and the visible compliance with maritime norms make the scenario easier to defend in allied councils than more overtly aggressive options, but advance coordination would still be essential.

4. Escalation and risk assessment

Russian strategic options in response

If Moscow assesses, internally, that Yantar was disabled by an external non-kinetic attack, it has several potential response paths that remain below open conflict:

• Undersea infrastructure pressure: Increased presence of Russian “research” and auxiliary vessels near Western cables and pipelines elsewhere, or actual sabotage under plausible deniability.

• Cyber operations: Activity against UK maritime, port or energy networks, calibrated to send a message without causing mass disruption.

• Mirroring behaviour: Adoption of similar non-kinetic techniques against Western survey or support ships in other theatres.

The scenario therefore risks normalising a tit-for-tat grey-zone contest in non-kinetic tools.

Attribution dilemma

Ambiguous attribution is both the enabling condition and a key vulnerability of the concept:

• If Russia cannot prove an attack, public accusations risk being dismissed as political theatre.

• If Russia can demonstrate clear EMP-type signatures, London faces uncomfortable questions about peacetime use of force and covert capabilities.

  
  

From an analytical standpoint, the UK would have to be confident that:

• Russian technical ability to attribute such an event is limited or politically constrained, or

• The strategic benefits of the action outweigh the reputational damage if attribution occurs.

Long-term normative impact

Finally, there is a broader normative issue: once such a precedent is set, it becomes harder to criticise others for similar behaviour.

• Authoritarian states may point to the precedent to justify their own “electronic accidents” affecting Western vessels.

• The line between acceptable electronic warfare and unlawful attacks on sovereign immune vessels becomes blurred.

Any decision to adopt this course in reality would therefore need to be set against a long time-horizon for the evolution of maritime and cyber norms.

5. Overall assessment

From an analytical perspective, my scenario produces a mixed but instructive outcome:

Strengths

• Imposes a concrete cost on a sensitive Russian platform engaged in hostile grey-zone activities.

• Delivers a strong narrative and diplomatic advantage if managed as a clean rescue with no exploitation.

• Demonstrates a sophisticated non-kinetic capability in a manner that is deniable yet legible to the primary audience (the Russian leadership).

• Preserves, at the visible level, the UK’s commitment to maritime law and humanitarian obligations.

Risks

• Constitutes, in substance, a peacetime use of force against a sovereign immune vessel, with associated legal and normative concerns.

• Creates scope for asymmetric retaliation, particularly against undersea infrastructure and in cyberspace.

• Introduces ambiguity and potential tension within NATO if not carefully coordinated and messaged.

• Contributes to the gradual erosion of clear red lines around non-kinetic attacks at sea.

Net judgement

As a scenario it exploits the gap between visible restraint and unseen capability in a way that is characteristic of contemporary grey-zone competition. In practice, whether such an option would be chosen would depend less on the technical feasibility of non-kinetic disablement and more on political appetite for accepting the escalation and normative risks described above.

Ultimately, this scenario goes to the heart of how states balance long-term deterrence of hostile grey-zone activity against the escalatory risks of using the one language Russia has historically appeared to respect: the demonstrable capability and willingness to impose concrete costs when its behaviour crosses defined lines.